The monetary character of trade, the existence of a common medium of exchange, is derived as an outcome of the economic general equilibrium in a class of examples. Two constructs are added to an Arrow-Debreu general equilibrium model: market segmentation with multiple budget constraints (one at each transaction) and transaction costs. The multiplicity of budget constraints creates a demand for a carrier of value between transactions. A common medium of exchange, money, arises endogenously as the most liquid (lowest transaction cost) asset. Government-issued fiat money has a positive equilibrium value due to its acceptability in payment of taxes. Scale economies in transaction cost account for uniqueness of the (fiat or commodity) money in equilibrium. The monetary structure of trade and the uniqueness of money in equilibrium can thus be derived from elementary price theory. (ii) Money is (virtually) unique. Though each economy has a 'money' and the 'money' differs among economies, almost all the transactions in most places most of the time use a single common medium of exchange. 1 This paper has benefited from seminars and colleagues' helpful comments at the University of California -Santa Barbara, University of California -San Diego, NSF-NBER Conference on General Equilibrium Theory at Purdue University, Society for the Advancement of Behavioral Economics at San Diego State University, Econometric Society at the University of Wisconsin -Madison, SITE at Stanford University, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, Midwest Economic Theory Conference at the University of Illinois -Urbana Champaign, University of Iowa, Southern California Economic Theory Conference at UC -Santa Barbara, Midwest Macroeconomics Conference at University of Iowa, University of California -Berkeley, European Workshop on General Equilibrium Theory at University of Paris I, Society for Economic Dynamics at San Jose Costa Rica, World Congress of the Econometric Society at University of Washington, Cowles Foundation at Yale University, and from comments of Meenakshi Rajeev. Remaining errors are the author's. 1 (iii) 'Money' is government-issued fiat money, trading at a positive value though it conveys directly no utility or production.
(iii) 'Money' is government-issued fiat money, trading at a positive value though it conveys directly no utility or production.
Where economic behavior displays such uniformity, a general elementary economic theory should be able to account for the universal usages. But each of these three observations contradicts the implications of a frictionless Walrasian general equilibrium model. This essay presents elementary structure in that model sufficient to derive points (i), (ii), and (iii) as outcomes. In doing so, this essay responds to a challenge expressed by Tobin (1980) Barter would restrict transactions to "double coincidences of wants" ...
[This] insight tells us why the social institution of money has been observed throughout history even in primitive societies. An insight is not a model, and it does not satisfy the trained scholarly consciences of modern theorists who require that all values be rooted, explicitly and mathematically, in the market valuations of maximizing agents... Thus the examples below are intended to satisfy our 'trained scholarly consciences ' and to show that a general equilibrium model can explain endogenously from price theory the institution of a common monetary means of payment 2 . The price system itself designates 'money' and guides transactors to trade using 'money.' The model emphasizes complete 2 A bibliography of the issues involved in this inquiry appears in Ostroy and Starr (1990) . In addition, note particularly Banerjee and Maskin (1996) , Hellwig (2000) , Howitt (2000) , Howitt and Clower (2000) , Iwai (1996) , Kiyotaki and Wright (1989) , Marimon, McGrattan and Sargent (1990) , Rey (2001) and Young (1998) . The treatment of transaction costs in this essay (as opposed to the recent focus in the literature on search and random matching equilibria) resembles the general equilibrium models with transaction cost developed in Foley (1970) , Hahn (1971), and Starrett (1973) . The structure of bilateral trade here however is more detailed, with a budget constraint enforced on each transaction separately, so that the Foley, Hahn, and Starrett models do not immediately translate to the present setting. 2 markets and complete information. The examples ---as distinct from random matching models ---include no uncertainty in transactors searching for matching trades.
It is well known that a frictionless Arrow-Debreu model cannot accomodate a role for money. This essay is intended as a partial counterexample, demonstrating that minimal friction in trade is sufficient to induce the existence of money as a result, not an assumption. Indeed prices specify which good acts as 'money.' The monetary structure of the economy is derived from elementary price theory in a class of examples. Use of a common medium of exchange, a commodity money, is an outcome of the market equilibrium. Starting from a (non-monetary) Arrow-Debreu Walrasian model, the monetary quality of the economic equilibrium is derived through the addition of two constructs: market segmentation with multiple budget constraints (one at each transaction) and transaction costs. Transaction costs imply differing bid and ask prices for each good. Commodity money arises endogenously (without government intervention or designation as legal tender) as the most liquid (lowest transaction cost or narrowest bid/ask spread) asset. Fiat money ---issued by government ---derives its positive value from acceptability in payment of taxes; it becomes the common medium of exchange from its low transaction cost. Uniqueness of (fiat or commodity) money, uniqueness of the common medium of exchange in equilibrium, follows from scale economy in transaction costs.
There is a fourth, less commonplace, observation that turns out to be a significant guide to modeling:
(iv) In a monetary economy, even transactions displaying a double coincidence of wants are transacted with money.
Because transactions involving a double coincidence of wants are relatively rare, this characterization of trade is less obvious. Nevertheless, University of California faculty whose children are enrolled at the University pay the student fees in money, not in kind;
Ford employees buying a Ford car pay for the car in money, not in kind; Albertson's supermarket checkout clerks acquiring groceries pay for their food in money, not in kind 3 .
3
Confirmed in telephone conversation with public relations offices at Ford and Albertson's. The public relations officers the author spoke to expressed some surprise at the notion that academic economists entertained the view that these trades would be made 3
This observation suggests that the focus on the absence of double coincidence of wants ---as distinct from transaction costs ---as an explanation for the monetization of trade may miss a significant part of the underlying causal mechanism.
Section III of the paper presents the model of segmented markets with linear transaction costs without double coincidence of wants, in a class of examples.
Commodity money is endogenously chosen in market equilibrium as the lowest transaction cost (narrowest bid/ask spread) commodity. Section IV demonstrates that the absence of Random matching/search models of monetary economies, typified by Kiyotaki and Wright (1989, 1991) and by Trejos and Wright (1993, 1995) , endogenously generate a medium of exchange function. They have recently been the most prominent and successful formal models to do so. They display distinctive elements differing from monetary general equilibrium models, Starrett (1973), Starr (1974), Iwai (1996) The present study and it's predecessors modeling general equilibrium with transaction cost, Foley(1970) , Hahn (1971 ), Starrett (1973 , reflect instead a formalization of Menger (1892)'s emphasis on asset liquidity as an explanation for monetization of trade.
The Kiyotaki and Wright (1989, 1991) models assume indivisible commodities held in unit quantity incurring a transaction cost on trade. One implication of indivisibility and unit quantity is that there is no meaningful price variation; all rates of exchange are unity. It is not possible to distinguish a retail price and a lower wholesale price or an asking price and a lower bid price. These are familiar elements of organized markets with transaction costs, and they enter essentially in the general equilibrium with transaction costs models of Foley (1970) , Hahn (1971 ), Starrett (1973 , and this essay. In a model with divisible goods (or with large quantities of indivisible goods), when two traders meet to trade it is possible to make a mutually advantageous trade with only a single coincidence of wants by discounting the undesired good. That is, suppose trader 1 has good A and wants good B, and trader 2 has good B and wants good C, and trader 3 has good C and wants good A (a typical absence of double coincidence of wants). It is possible for 1 and 2 to exchange B for A to mutual benefit, even though 2 does not want A, by discounting A sufficiently so that 2 can advantageously retrade it. In this sense, sufficient price variation should allow several or all goods to act as media of exchange, Starr (1976) and Example III.2 below. Indivisibility and unit quantity in Kiyotaki and Wright (1989, 1991) limit price variation so that this is not possible. Trejos and Wright (1993, 1995) consider divisible money and trade in services.
Services are nondurable and hence not retradable (and there are no service IOU's) so they cannot act as commodity money. Again, since trade is in isolated pairs, and there is no retrade, there is no meaningful concept of bid and ask or wholesale versus retail price.
In order endogenously to generate a function for money or a medium of exchange, there have to be some frictions in the trading arrangements. Random matching/search, like transaction cost or overlapping generations, presents a friction. The random matching/search formalization of the friction in trade has a very classical implication: in the rare case where two agents have a double coincidence of wants and meet to trade, they will trade their goods or services directly for one another, Kiyotaki and Wright (1991) , Trejos and Wright (1993) . This is a distinctive feature, distinguishing the random matching/search models from general equilibrium with transaction cost models. In general equilibrium models with transaction cost, including the present model, trade takes place between individuals and the market or market maker, not directly between individuals.
Hence, even in the rare instance of double coincidence of wants, general equilibrium models with transaction cost do not predict direct trade between parties with reciprocal demands and supplies. Monetization is the common outcome of the equilibrium of the trading process.
Menger's proposed solution to this puzzle focused on the liquidity of commodities.
A good is very saleable (liquid) in Menger's definition above, if the price at which a household can sell it (the market's prevailing bid price) is very near the price at which it can buy (the market's prevailing ask price). Menger suggests that liquid goods, those with a narrow spread between bid and ask prices, become principal media of exchange, money.
Liquidity creates monetization. This is the insight that will be formalized in the examples below. It is not clear whether Menger regards liquidity as an inherent quality of a commodity or as endogenously determined in the market. In the examples below both sources of liquidity arise ---some goods have naturally lower transaction costs than others ceteris paribus, but the bid/ask spread is the market price of liquidity, endogenously determined in equilibrium. 8
In order to fix our ideas, we shall imagine that the place which serves as a market for the exchange of all the commodities ... for one another is divided into as many (1970) and Hahn (1971) embodies both the notion that there are businesses specializing in the transaction function (retailers, wholesalers, etc.) and a convenient abbreviation.
Rather than depict the transaction costs incurred at the level of the individual transactor separately, those costs are thought to be bundled into the costs of the transacting firm and priced in the difference between buying and selling prices of goods. The alternative is to describe a transaction technology for each firm and household as in Kurz (1974) 
or in
Heller and Starr (1976) . The transaction technology posited here supposes that all trading posts for good j have the same transaction technology for j. This is in contrast to Banerjee and Maskin (1996) where various traders have differing transaction costs (difficulty in assessing product quality) for the same good. 11 of good n. For purposes of simplicity in the examples below, each household is endowed with only one commodity. This is obviously inessential. h's utility function is
Good 0 is specialized as the input to the transactions process, though it can also be Each node in the figures represents a commodity. Active trade is represented by a chord between nodes. A barter economy will have chords among a wide variety of goods ---one for each pair of goods where there is a household with a matching demand and supply (e.g. Figures 3 and 4) . A monetary economy with a unique money will be a sparser array.
There will be one good so that the only chords are those linking that good to all others (e.g. Figure 1 ). The question why is there money? is then reduced to asking for sufficient conditions so that the array of active trading posts in equilibrium looks like figure 1 instead of figure 4.
Jevons (1875) reminds us that monetization of trade follows in part from the absence of a double coincidence of wants. In the present model, that logic is particularly powerful. Absence of coincidence of wants means that the typical traded good will be traded more than once in moving from endowment to consumption. Barter trade successfully rearranging the allocation to an equilibrium will transact an endowment first at the trading post where it is supplied and again at a distinct post where it is demanded.
Hence monetary trade as an alternative (substituting retrade of money for the retrade of nonmonetary goods) can be undertaken without increasing total trading volume or transaction cost, even without scale economies. Conversely, when there is a full double coincidence of wants and linear transaction cost, equilibrium will be non-monetary even in the presence of a natural money (section III).
Generations of economists have noted that some goods are more suitable than others as media of exchange.
7 Some of the properties of money ---general acceptability and price predictability, for example ---are conferred as part of the monetary equilibrium.
Others are the indigenous property of the commodity, represented here as transaction costs: durability, portability, recognizibility, divisibility. The transaction cost function C {i,j} is sufficiently flexible to distinguish transaction costs differing among commodities, for example to distinguish the transactions costs of mint-standardized gold medallions from those of fresh fish.
We now formalize the classic notion of the absence of double coincidence of wants. Let N be an integer, N≥ 3. A bit of additional notation is helpful to characterize permutations of the N actively traded commodities. For m=1,2,...,N, and positive integers
That is, m⊕i denotes m+i mod N, skipping 0 (since good 0 is used primarily as an input to Equilibria with scale economies in transaction cost will be characterized as monetary with a unique money: a single good will be distinguished in equilibrium as the medium of exchange common to virtually all transactions. Uniqueness of the medium of exchange results from scale economies in the transaction technology. Rey (2001) develops the implications of scale economies in transaction costs as a thick markets exernality emphasizing international currency markets. Starr and Stinchcombe (1999) characterizes monetary trade, with a unique money, as the cost minimizing outcome of a centralized programming problem with scale economies. In section VI below a similar 21 result is established in a decentralized model using the price system; monetary trade with a single money is a decentralized market equilibrium.
Scale economy is not a necessary condition for uniqueness of the medium of exchange in equilibrium (Example III.1), but scale economy helps to ensure uniqueness (Example VI.1, below). If there is a unique low transaction cost instrument in an economy with a linear transaction cost structure, that natural money will be the unique medium of exchange in equilibrium. If there are many equally low cost candidates for the medium of exchange, then scale economy in transaction costs will allow one to be endogenously chosen as the unique medium of exchange. Inherent low cost and market determined high volume combine to yield unique monetization. Menger (1892) When trading volumes are sufficiently low, the nonconvexity is not apparent in costs incurred (but can still affect price-taking competitive behavior). Then an average cost pricing equilibrium is indistinguishable from a competitive equilibrium with the linear 23 used is an average cost pricing equilibrium resulting in zero profits for the typical trading post firm (this has the additional technical benefit that trading post firms make no net profit, so no account need be taken of distribution of profits to shareholders). The rationale for this choice of equilibrium concept is the threat of entry (by other similar firms) if any economic rent is actually earned. The presence of potential entrants and their actions is not explicitly modeled.
An average cost pricing equilibrium consists of q o{i,j} It is useful to recognize the network externality present in this model. When good i is the common medium of exchange, all households want to acquire good i because it is the common medium of exchange. That is, everyone demands good i because everyone else demands i. This is perfectly rational, not because of bandwagon or herd effects but out of narrow rational calculation of costs. Since everyone else is using good i to buy all other goods, (average) transaction costs for i versus other goods are low, reflecting a scale economy, which means that each remaining household finds it advantageous to acquire good i and use it as medium of exchange 10 . Viewing the same issue from the viewpoint of a trading post {i,n}, the availability and low bid/ask spread of posts {i,j} trading good i (the common medium of exchange) for most other goods j≠i, j≠n, means that a trading post {i,n} faces high demand for its services. In H κ , all of the households [m,m⊕l] so that m⊕l = n sell their endowments on {i,m} and then seek to trade on {i,n}.
The low transaction costs of the posts {i,m} create a high demand for the complementary services of {i,n}.
10
Hahn(1997) recognizes this externality, noting that in the presence of market set-up costs, each transactor in the market benefits from the participation of others. Young (1998) assumes the externality without additional explanation. Rey (2001) denotes this interaction the "thick markets externality." 28
VII. Government-Issued Fiat Money
In order to study fiat money we introduce a government with the unique power to issue fiat money. Fiat money is intrinsically worthless; it enters no one's utility function.
But the government is uniquely capable of declaring it acceptable in payment of taxes.
Adam Smith(1776) notes "A prince, who should enact that a certain proportion of his taxes be paid in a paper money of a certain kind, might thereby give a certain value to this paper money…" (v. I, book II, ch. 2). Abba Lerner(1947) comments
The modern state can make anything it chooses generally acceptable as money and thus establish its value quite apart from any connection, even of the most formal kind, with gold or with backing of any kind. It is true that a simple declaration that such and such is money will not do, even if backed by the most convincing constitutional evidence of the state's absolute sovereignty. But if the state is willing to accept the proposed money in payment of taxes and other obligations to itself the trick is done. Everyone who has obligations to the state will be willing to accept the pieces of paper with which he can settle the obligations, and all other people will be willing to accept these pieces of paper because they know that the taxpayers, etc., will be willing to accept them in turn.
Taxation ---and fiat money's guaranteed value in payment of taxes ---explains the positive equilibrium value of fiat money 11 . Scale economies explain its uniqueness as the medium of exchange.
As an economic agent, government is denoted G. Government sells tax receipts, the N+1 st good. It also sells good N+2, an intrinsically worthless instrument, (latent See also Li and Wright (1998) and Starr (1974) . What's happening in Example VII.1? Transaction costs are assumed linear, so scale economies do not come into play in this example. Good N+2 is latent fiat money. It is a low transaction cost instrument suitable for paying taxes. That is, the market for N+2 versus N+1 (tax receipts) operates without transaction cost at a price ratio of 1:1. That would be enough to give N+2 a nonzero equilibrium price on other {m, N+2} trading posts, but that doesn't make N+2 a common medium of exchange. For N+2 to be a common medium of exchange requires that N+2 have low transaction cost, that In real life fiat money economies, government-issued fiat money is typically the unique common medium of exchange: in the US virtually all transactions are denominated in US dollars; in the UK virtually all (nonfinancial) transactions are denominated in pounds sterling. The virtual uniqueness of the monetary instrument is not merely a possibility; it seems to be a general fact. Dollars, euros, pounds sterling, and other government-issued fiat money's all seem to have similar low transaction costs. But in any single market economy precisely one of these instruments is likely to be the unique common medium of exchange. Prof. Tobin(1980) reminds us, above, that uniqueness is likely to be the result of scale economy. Example VII.2 harnesses this observation to explain why fiat money is (almost universally) the unique common medium of exchange.
Particularly in the case of scale economies in the transactions technology, there is a strong tendency to multiple equilibria. This creates an interest in determining which of the several equilibria the economy will actually select. One solution to this problem is to posit an adjustment process to equilibrium that makes the choice. Hence we use the following Tatonnement adjustment process for average cost pricing equilibrium: Prices will be adjusted by an average cost pricing auctioneer.
Specify the following adjustment process for prices.
STEP 0: The starting point is somewhat arbitrary. In each pairwise market the bid/ask spread is set at average cost for low trading volume. This plausible adjustment process explains why government-issued fiat money becomes the unique common medium of exchange ----and would do so even in the absence of legal tender rules. Government has two distinctive characteristics: it has the power to support the value of fiat money by making it acceptable in payment of taxes; it is a large economic presence undertaking a high volume of transactions in the economy. Governnment's size means that it operates on sufficient scale to achieve scale economies (when the transaction technology admits them). In particular, if government is active on the posts trading fiat money for other goods then these trading posts will have the benefit of scale economies and low average transaction cost. Hence, government can make its fiat money the common medium of exchange merely by using it as such. The scale economies implied will make fiat money the low transaction cost instrument and hence the most suitable medium of exchange, not just for government but for all transactors. Government expenditures in all goods markets in exchange for N+2 (and large household demand to acquire N+2 to finance tax payments) result in a large trading volume on the trading posts for good N+2 versus n=1,...,N. Volume is large enough that scale economies kick in. The average cost pricing auctioneer adjusts prices, the bid/ask spread, to reflect the scale economies. The bid/ask spreads incurred on trading m for m⊕i by way of good N+2 become considerably narrower than on trading m for m⊕i directly.
The price system then directs each household to the market {m,N+2} where its endowment is traded against good N+2. The household sells all its endowment there for N+2 and trades N+2 subsequently for tax payments and desired consumption. Scale economy has turned N+2 from a mere tax payment coupon into 'money,' the unique universally used common medium of exchange.
VII. Conclusion
The taxonomy of cases developed is depicted in the Fiat money derives its positive value from acceptability in payment of taxes. Fiat money becomes the unique common medium of exchange when government taxation and purchases are sufficiently large that scale economies in transaction costs make it the low (average) transaction cost instrument.
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The monetary character of trade, the existence of a common medium of exchange in economic equilibrium, can be logically derived from a (non-monetary) Arrow-Debreu Walrasian model through the addition of two constructs: segmented markets with multiple budget constraints (one at each transaction) and transaction costs. The multiplicity of budget constraints creates a demand for a carrier of value (medium of exchange) between transactions. Money (the common medium of exchange) arises endogenously as the most liquid (lowest transaction cost) asset. Government-issued fiat money derives its value from acceptability in payment of taxes. Uniqueness of the monetary instrument (fiat or commodity money) in equilibrium comes from scale economies in transaction cost.
The monetary structure of trade in general equilibrium, the uniqueness of money, and the existence of a fiat money equilibrium can be derived from elementary price theory.
